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I use the tax reserve data available from FIN 48 to investigate whether equity market 
value and tax risk exhibit a concave association, consistent with an optimal level of tax risk 
from an equity valuation standpoint. I find a concave association between tax risk and firm 
value which suggests firm value is increasing in tax risk at a diminishing rate until an optimal 
level is reached, after which firm value is decreasing in tax risk. I do not find evidence of 
excessive risk taking in the context of tax avoidance. Instead almost all firms in my sample 
are below the average implied optimal level of tax risk. Tax risk impacts firm value not only 
through its effect on expectations about future cash flows but also through its effect on the 
cost of equity capital. I also document a higher average optimal level of tax risk for firms 
where the CEO is not the chairman of the board, consistent with an agency view of tax 
avoidance. I find that institutional ownership levels moderate the association between tax risk 
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In the wake of recent accounting scandals and the financial crisis that began in 2007 
investors have become increasingly concerned about excessive risk taking by high-level 
managers and CEOs. In the interest of increased short-term profits and stock prices, 
managers often engage in “risky activities that may be adverse to the interest of long-term 
investors and society” (Strine 2009). These activities may include excessive risk from 
increased leverage, investments in overly risky projects, or other speculative activities. While 
often overlooked, tax risk is an important type of risk that can generate significant costs 
(Wilson 2009) not only in terms of monetary penalties but also reputational damage. Tax risk 
is the degree of risk or uncertainty of sustainability inherent in a firm’s tax positions. The 
potential costs from IRS detection and reversal of uncertain and risky tax positions create 
incentives to curb excessive risk taking. However, investors prefer some degree of tax risk 
despite the potential costs, since riskier tax planning activities provide opportunities for 
higher cash tax savings and higher after-tax earnings. In this paper, I use the tax reserves 
disclosed under FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) to explore the association between tax 
risk and firm equity valuations.  
Researchers have examined the relation between firm value and tax avoidance with 
mixed results.1 While some studies have found firm value to be increasing in tax avoidance 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2009a; Koester 2011; Song and Tucker 2008), others have found 
negative market reactions to certain types of tax avoidance (Desai and Hines 2002; Hanlon 
                                                 
 
1 Tax avoidance refers to “the reduction of explicit taxes” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, p.137) and encompasses 
all forms of tax planning regardless of uncertainty or risk. Tax avoidance includes but is not limited to tax risky 
positions. Most of the literature to-date has focused on tax avoidance in general or on “tax aggressiveness” 




and Slemrod 2009). The literature examining the agency perspective of tax avoidance and the 
role of governance (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Chen et al. 2010) has 
provided deeper insights but has not been able to fully explain the association between firm 
value and tax avoidance.  
I build on this literature by examining three aspects of the association between firm 
value and tax risk.  First, I investigate the possibility of an optimal level of tax risk. Many 
researchers have alluded to or directly noted the likelihood of an optimal level of tax 
avoidance or tax aggressiveness (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 
2011; Chyz et al. 2011; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; De Waegenaere et al. 2010; Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009). From a theoretical standpoint, tax risk is accompanied by both costs and 
benefits which suggests an optimal level occurs where the marginal benefits equal the 
marginal costs. If there is some optimal level of tax risk from an equity valuation standpoint 
then the empirical relation between firm value and tax risk should be concave. All of the 
previous studies have relied on linear associations between tax risk and firm value or non-
linearities due to mitigating factors such as governance. My study fills this gap in the 
literature by examining whether the relation between firm equity value and tax risk is 
concave, consistent with an optimal level of tax risk. 
Second, I examine whether the association between firm value and tax risk is at least 
partially driven by a positive association between tax risk and the cost of equity capital. To 
my knowledge, no study has directly examined whether tax avoidance affects firm value only 
through expectations about future cash flows (numerator) or also through the discount rate 




through which tax risk affects firm value is important for a thorough understanding of the 
relation between tax risk and firm value. If tax risk impacts not only expectations about 
future cash flows but also the cost of capital, the implication is that investors require 
compensation for information uncertainty caused by tax risk. 
Lastly, I examine whether the associations between tax risk and firm value and tax 
risk and the cost of capital are attenuated by governance. According to an agency view of tax 
avoidance, tax risk facilitates managerial diversion because managers can justify obscurity on 
the premise that proprietary costs of tax risk need to be protected (Desai and Dharmapala 
2006, 2007, 2009b). In this framework, governance restrains managerial opportunism that is 
afforded by tax risk (Desai and Dharmapala 2009a). If equity investors believe governance 
restrains managerial opportunism afforded by tax risk, then governance should moderate the 
association between tax risk and firm value and the association between tax risk and the cost 
of capital.  
I find a concave association between firm value and tax risk that is robust to several 
specifications including a two-stage least squares estimation to correct for endogeneity.  I 
find little evidence of excessive risk taking in the context of tax avoidance.  In fact, almost all 
of the firms in my sample are below the average optimal level of tax risk, consistent with 
research that suggests firms under utilize tax saving strategies (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; 
Desai and Dharmapala 2009a; Rego and Wilson 2011; Weisbach 2002). The firms in my 
sample would have to increase their tax reserves by at least $733 billion, cumulatively, to get 
all firms to the average optimal level of tax risk. I find a positive association between tax risk 




risk is driven not only by the effect of tax risk on expectations about future cash flows but 
also its effect on the discount rate applied to cash flows. Lastly, I find mixed evidence for the 
agency view of tax avoidance.  Investors of firms where the CEO is not the chairman of the 
board are willing to bear more tax risk than investors of other firms. Institutional ownership 
also moderates the association between tax risk and firm value but the average optimal level 
of tax risk does not vary with institutional ownership. The results are mixed regarding 
whether the association between tax risk and the cost of capital is attenuated, or even 
eliminated, for better governed firms. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. First, my study 
answers several calls to research. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) call for more research into 
tax aggressiveness, and Graham et al. (2011) call for more research regarding the equity 
valuation of tax reserves. A deeper, more refined understanding of this relation is needed 
given the mixed results from prior research. This is the first study to examine whether a 
concave association between firm value and tax risk is descriptive of the true nature of 
investor perceptions of tax risk. This is also the first study to directly investigate the relation 
between tax risk and the equity cost of capital.2 I provide evidence in support of previous 
concerns that companies are below the optimal level of tax risk and provide an estimate of 
the economic impacts of the shortage. Lastly, I provide evidence regarding the agency view 
of tax avoidance and the impact governance has on the relation between tax risk and firm 
value. 
                                                 
 
2 In the context of earnings quality, Dhaliwal et al. (2008) examine the association between book-tax differences 
and the cost of equity capital. Although not the focus of the study, book tax differences have been used 
extensively to proxy for tax avoidance. My study is the first to examine the association between tax risk, a 




From a practical standpoint, policy makers and managers can use the results of this 
study as empirical evidence regarding how investors perceive tax risk. Although other 
stakeholders and concerns drive the decision to engage in risky tax behavior and my 
estimations are specific to my sample of firms, the economic magnitude of my results 
suggests that at least some firms are not taking full advantage of tax savings opportunities 
from an equity investor’s standpoint.3  
Understanding how shareholders view tax risk is pertinent for both managers and for 
policy makers. Tom Neubig and Balvinder Sangha, partners in the Quantitative Economics 
and Statistics practice of Ernst & Young LLP, argue that “it is imperative that strong 
corporate governance processes recognize this [tax] risk and that corporate boards and senior 
management deliberately decide how much tax risk is consistent with the overall corporate 
risk profile to satisfy shareholder expectations” (Neubig and Sangha 2004). The question for 
managers, then, is how does tax risk fit into overall firm risk and how do investors perceive 
tax risk? Managing the tradeoff between the costs inherent in risky tax transactions and the 
potential benefits is a difficult task. Finding the “optimal” level of tax risk depends on many 
factors including the risk preferences of each company’s investors. My study provides 
important insights regarding those preferences.  
In Section 2, I provide definitions and a brief background, a review of prior research, 
and the hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design, and Section 4 
provides a description of the sample. I provide the main results in Section 5 and outline 
various additional analyses in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.   
                                                 
 
3 I report only the implied average optimal level of tax risk from an equity stakeholder’s perspective and 




2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Tax Risk and FIN 48 
I define tax avoidance following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) as “the reduction of 
explicit taxes” (p.137). Tax avoidance includes all types of managerial efforts and 
transactions intended to reduce the firm’s taxes, whether clearly legal, uncertain, or illegal. 
Recent studies have proposed tax avoidance as a continuum of tax planning activities where 
highly certain (with regards to ultimate sustainability) transactions lie towards the left and 
highly uncertain transactions towards the right (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky 2010; 
Lisowsky et al. 2011). For example, investments in municipal bonds (certainly legal) might 
be to the far left and tax evasion (which is illegal tax avoidance) would be to the far right 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
I define tax risk with respect to the position a firm’s tax transactions have along such 
a continuum. Tax risk is the degree of risk or uncertainty of sustainability inherent in a firm’s 
tax positions. Rego and Wilson (2011) state, “uncertain (i.e., aggressive or risky) tax 
positions are those that are supported by a relatively weak set of facts and are thus, less likely 
to be sustained upon audit” (p.4).4 Using this definition, tax risk can also be understood as a 
subset of tax avoidance where the technical support and thus the ultimate sustainability for 
the tax position are less than certain.5 
                                                 
 
4 “Tax aggressiveness” has also been used in this literature to describe tax avoidance that is less than certain. 
Conceptually, it is similar to tax risk. However, given the varied definitions of tax aggressiveness, I limit my 
use of the term to descriptions of prior research and citations of previous findings. 
5 In this study, I use the term “tax risk” to describe both the degree of risk and also a subset of tax avoidance. I 




Tax risk is a construct that has been recognized in recent academic research (Brown 
et al. 2011; Chyz 2011; Chyz et al. 2011; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Rego and Wilson 2011) 
as well as in the business community (Neubig and Sangha 2004). To operationalize tax risk, I 
follow Brown et al. (2011) and use a firm’s tax reserve disclosed under the requirements of 
FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, effective 
for year ends beginning after December 15, 2006.6  
FIN 48 requires companies to disclose their unrecognized tax benefits and a roll-
forward of the main components from the prior year. The balance of unrecognized tax 
benefits represents a liability (the tax reserve) for any positions taken on tax returns that 
might be questioned and potentially overturned by tax authorities. FIN 48 requires 
assessment of all tax positions using a two-step process. First the company must decide 
whether the tax position is “more-likely-than-not” to be sustained upon audit by tax 
authorities (and including potential litigation and appeals). Tax positions that do not meet the 
“more-likely-than-not” threshold require an offsetting reserve for the entire amount of the tax 
benefit. Positions that meet the “more-likely-than-not” threshold are measured as “the largest 
amount of tax benefit that is greater than 50 percent likely of being realized . . .” (FASB 
2006). The difference between the tax benefit realized and this measured amount, if any, is 
recorded in the financial statements as the tax reserve.  
The tax reserve is a better proxy for tax risk than extant measures of tax avoidance 
that rely on differences between book and taxable income or effective tax rates. Although 
many of these measures may be correlated with tax risk (Alexander et al. 2009; Cazier et al. 
                                                 
 




2009; Frischmann et al. 2008), they do not specifically capture the degree of risk in a 
company’s tax positions.7 Tax reserves, on the other hand, explicitly capture those tax 
positions that are less likely to be sustained. Lisowsky et al. (2011) find that the ending 
balance of tax reserves is a predictor of tax shelters, a particularly aggressive form of tax 
avoidance. Other researchers have proposed using the tax reserve as a general proxy for tax 
aggressiveness (Alexander et al. 2009; Cazier et al. 2009; Frischmann et al. 2008; Hanlon 
and Heitzman 2010; Rego and Wilson 2011). 
However, researchers have expressed concern about the measurement error inherent 
in using the tax reserve to proxy for tax risk given the reserve’s susceptibility to managerial 
manipulation (Alexander et al. 2009; Cazier et al. 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Koester 
2011). Cazier et al. (2009) explain: “ . . . if firms follow the recognition and measurement 
procedures prescribed by FIN 48, the amount of tax benefits recognized in the financial 
statements is a function of two factors: 1) how conservative the firm is in its financial 
reporting, and 2) how aggressive the firm is in its tax planning” (p.13). In fact, studies have 
found evidence of earnings management through the tax reserves although to a lesser extent 
in the post-FIN 48 period (Cazier et al. 2011; Gupta et al. 2011). Lisowsky et al. (2011) 
calculate a discretionary component of the tax reserve and find that it reduces but does not 
eliminate the usefulness of the reserve as a predictor of tax shelters, specifically. It is not 
                                                 
 
7 An alternative to book tax difference and effective tax rate measures is tax shelter probability scores. 
Although these scores reflect one of the most risky forms of tax avoidance they fail to account for any non-




clear whether financial reporting tendencies are strong enough to negate the usefulness of the 
reserve as a general proxy for tax risk.8  
Related Literature 
 A traditional view of corporate tax avoidance regards any activity that reduces cash 
payments for taxes as a value-enhancing transfer of wealth from the government to 
shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2009a). However, tax avoidance is not costless to the 
firm. Direct costs of implementing tax planning strategies include the time and resources of 
employees and fees paid to outside advisors (Rego and Wilson 2011). Tax risk – that is, risky 
forms of tax avoidance – is accompanied by additional benefits in the form of increased cash 
tax savings but also additional costs relative to certain tax avoidance. The additional costs 
include the potential for disallowance of tax savings, interest and penalties assessed by taxing 
authorities (Rego and Wilson 2011), accounting and legal costs for tax audits and litigation, 
the costs of obscuring the activities from tax authorities (Desai and Dharmapala 2009a), 
increases in future scrutiny from tax authorities (Koester 2011), and reputational and political 
costs from being considered a “poor corporate citizen” (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Rego and 
Wilson 2011; Watson 2011).  
Recent literature grounded in agency theory has focused on another potential cost of 
tax risk – increased managerial diversion. Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2007) argue that tax 
aggressiveness and managerial opportunism are complementary, and they call this 
perspective the “agency perspective on tax avoidance” (2007, p.3). Managers may claim that 
                                                 
 
8 To address these concerns I control for financial reporting aggressiveness in the empirical design using 
discretionary accruals. I also employ an instrumental variables specification that controls for measurement error 




tax objectives necessitate obscurity related to their risky tax activities. They use this 
obscurity as a shield to participate in other types of opportunism or self-serving behavior 
(Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2007, 2009b).9  
Given the presence of the costs and benefits to tax risk, it is not clear how investors 
value tax risk. Researchers have provided mixed evidence on the equity valuation of tax 
avoidance in general and on the potential mitigating effects of governance in the presence of 
agency costs.10 Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) examine a broad sample of publicly-traded 
companies and document a positive association between Tobin’s Q and book-tax differences 
for firms with high levels of institutional ownership (and low levels of the Gompers et al. 
2003 index) but no association in poorly governed firms. Within specific subsets of 
companies, some studies have documented a similar positive valuation of tax avoidance in 
well governed firms but no association in poorly governed firms (Cheng et al. 2011; Chyz et 
al. 2011). Other studies have found evidence supporting the view that investors are 
concerned about the increased managerial diversion afforded by tax avoidance but the results 
are mixed regarding whether tax avoidance is generally viewed positively (Wang 2010) or 
negatively (Dhaliwal et al. 2011).11 
                                                 
 
9 I refer to any activities “benefiting managers that are not in the interest of shareholders” (p. 172) as managerial 
diversion following Desai and Dharmapala (2009b). According to Wilson (2009), this may include “the excess 
consumption of perquisites or the pursuit of activities designed to mislead investors” (p. 970). 
10 Although several studies point to whether managers of high tax risk firms actually engage in increased 
managerial diversion (Blaylock 2011; Wang 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011), I limit my discussion to those studies 
that provide evidence about whether investors believe managers of high tax risk firms engage in increased 
managerial diversion since the latter are directly relevant to an equity valuation of tax risk. Other studies rely on 
firm behavior as a response to market demands to make inferences about investor perceptions regarding tax risk 
and agency costs (Chen et al. 2010; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Seidman and Stomberg 2011). 
11 Results are also mixed regarding market reactions to participation in tax shelters specifically (Hanlon and 




 A few studies have investigated the market valuation of the tax reserve using the first 
quarter of required disclosures. Song and Tucker (2008) find that the amount of firms’ tax 
reserves is positively related to the market to book ratio. Frischmann et al. (2008) find a 
positive association between returns and the portion of the tax reserve that will impact the 
effective tax rate. Robinson and Schmidt (2011) find a positive market reaction to the 2007 
first quarter tax reserve for large firms (S&P 500). For smaller firms (S&P 600) they find a 
positive reaction when disclosure quality is low and no reaction when disclosure quality is 
high, which suggests investors value tax risk but are also concerned about the proprietary 
costs of revealing too much information to taxing authorities.12 To my knowledge, Koester 
(2011) is the only study that uses a broad sample of tax reserve data spanning several years to 
examine the association with firm value. Using tax reserve data from Compustat, she 
documents a positive association between firm stock price and the portion of the tax reserve 
expected to impact the effective tax rate, but only for companies with significant operations 
in tax havens.  
Generally the results are mixed and often confusing given that certain subsets of firms 
seem to have no market reaction to tax avoidance. Based on the literature, it seems clear the 
association between tax risk and firm value is complex and warrants continued research. 
Regarding the agency view of tax avoidance, Blaylock (2011) notes there is not enough large 
                                                 
 
12 This result suggests that financial reporting quality is an important variable when modeling the relationship 
between tax risk and firm value. I include firm size and the standard deviation of returns, both of which have 
been shown to be associated with disclosure quality in the annual report (Lang and Lundholm 1993). Following 





sample empirical evidence to determine conclusively whether it applies broadly in a U.S. 
setting.  
In both the traditional tax avoidance literature and the agency view of tax avoidance, 
researchers have alluded to and often directly noted the possibility of an optimal level of tax 
avoidance (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2011; Chyz et al. 2011; 
Crocker and Slemrod 2005; De Waegenaere et al. 2010; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). 
Consistent with a typical optimization problem, investors want managers to maximize the 
benefits of tax avoidance net of the associated costs. More specifically, investors value tax 
risk until the marginal benefits no longer exceed the marginal costs. Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009) label this level as “optimally aggressive” (p.126). If there is some optimal level of tax 
risk from an investor’s perspective, firm value should be increasing at a diminishing rate 
until this optimal level is reached and decreasing in tax risk that goes beyond the optimal 
level. Empirically, this relation should manifest in a non-linear, concave association between 
firm value and tax risk. Despite the fact that researchers recognize the costs of tax avoidance 
and the implication of an optimal level, no study to-date has empirically investigated whether 
a concave relation exists.  
Hypothesis Development 
 To demonstrate how tax risk affects firm value, I use a simplified equity valuation 
model. As shown in equation (1), firm value can be expressed as the expected value of future 
cash flows (C) divided by one plus a discount rate (r), where the discount rate is equal to the 






In a simple two period scenario equation (1) is reduced to 
1  
(2) 
where the firm reveals the level of tax risk, R, at the beginning of period one and investors 
value the firm at the beginning of period one based on the observed level of R and 
expectations about cash flows during the time from period one to period two.13 Holding pre-
tax cash flows constant, future cash flows depend on whether the firm retains the expected 
tax savings from risky tax planning or whether taxing authorities disallow the tax savings and 
impose penalties. Following the spirit of the Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) model for tax 
sheltering, I express future cash flows in expected value terms as the sum of the probability 
of disallowance (p) times the net cash flows if tax savings are disallowed (D) and one minus 
the probability of disallowance times the net cash flows if tax savings are sustained (S).  
1  (3) 
Koester (2011) details the ways tax risk impacts expectations about future cash flows. 
She describes three negative valuation effects. First, higher tax reserves increase the 
likelihood and thoroughness of audit and therefore the likelihood of disallowance for current 
year and prior tax positions. Also, riskier tax positions by definition have less technical 
support and are therefore more likely to be disallowed once discovered. Second, higher tax 
                                                 
 
13 In this context, the period might be more than one year since tax returns are not filed until months after the 
financial year end and assessments of tax penalties often occur in later periods. The future cash flow 





reserves increase the likelihood and thoroughness of audit for future tax positions which 
means managers will either reduce future tax risk to avoid further scrutiny or incur greater 
costs to conceal the continued tax risk. Third, firms with high levels of tax risk might earn a 
negative reputation for being a “poor corporate citizen” which could affect future cash flows 
through relationships with customers and suppliers, increased Congressional scrutiny which 
leads to disallowance of tax preferences, or additional future costs if an unscrupulous 
manager is found to be engaging in other dishonest activities.  
 Koester (2011) also lists two positive valuation impacts of tax risk. First, firms 
engaging in high levels of tax risk may earn a positive reputation for being good stewards of 
firm resources. Second, if the benefits of tax risk are expected to be retained and current 
levels of tax risk are indicators about future levels of tax risk, then cash tax savings from both 
current tax positions and future tax positions should be higher. 
Each of these valuation effects from tax risk can be incorporated in equation (3).14 
The first valuation effect noted by Koester (2011) relates to the probability of disallowance 
(p). To incorporate the others, let A represent the additional cash tax savings from engaging 
in risky tax avoidance and the positive reputation effects. If I is the after-tax cash flow 
assuming no risky tax planning then S=I+A. The additional cash tax savings and positive 
reputation effects are forfeited under the disallowance scenario. If the risky tax planning is 
discovered and disallowed, the firm will incur costs and penalties equal to f so that D=I-f. 
The costs and penalties may include expenses for litigation or tax audits, direct interest and 
                                                 
 
14 Koester’s (2011) second valuation effect is the probability of future scrutiny and its impact on manager 
behavior in future periods. I do not specifically incorporate this effect into the model because it is not relevant 




penalties imposed by the taxing authority, or negative reputational penalties. The penalties 
are likely to be more severe when tax avoidance is riskier. Substituting these relationships 
into equation (3) yields the following: 
1  (4) 
The probability of disallowance (p), the penalties (f), and the additional tax savings 
and positive reputation effects (A) are all increasing in tax risk as previously described. 
Expressing each of the terms in the model as its function of tax risk (R), equation (4) 
becomes: 
1  (5) 
The impact of tax risk (R) on the expression is the first derivative as shown below. 
1  
(6) 
Equation (6) simplifies to: 
1  
(7) 
Each of the partial derivative terms above are positive since penalties (f), additional cash tax 
savings (A), and the likelihood of disallowance (p) are increasing in tax risk. The result is 
that the first term of the expression is negative, the second is positive, and the last is negative. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether firm value is increasing or decreasing in tax risk. The 
direction depends on the relative magnitude of the three terms in the model. More 
importantly, the result demonstrates that the direction of the effect of tax risk on firm value 




The second-order condition for a maximum, which would indicate that the non-
linearity is specifically concave, requires the second derivative of the expression, shown 
below, to be negative.  
2 1  
(8) 
For this expression to be negative, the following condition must be met: 
1 2  
(9) 
Without knowing the specific form of the association between tax risk and the other 
parameters (A), (p), or (f), predictions about the second derivatives cannot be made. Whether 
the relation between tax risk and firm value is concave remains an empirical question. Based 
on the preceding discussion, there should be some optimal level of tax risk from equity 
investors’ viewpoint where the marginal benefits of tax risk equal its marginal costs. This 
leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: There is a concave association between tax risk and firm value. 
I may not find evidence of a concave association if there is no statistically significant 
relation at all between firm value and tax risk or if investors are unable to accurately glean 
any information from the FIN 48 disclosures. Also, it is possible that within the relevant 
range of my sample, the association between firm value and tax risk is purely linear. In other 
words, no firm in my sample has reached the level where investors believe the costs of tax 
risk outweigh its benefits. 
 It is also possible that tax risk affects the denominator of equation (2), the cost of 




There are three potential sources of information uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
First, risky tax avoidance creates information uncertainty since it is, by definition, less certain 
in terms of ultimate sustainability.15 Second, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) explain that tax 
planning increases complexity in the organization which leads to increased information 
uncertainty and information asymmetry between investors if the complexity is not adequately 
communicated to stakeholders. Consistent with this argument, they find a positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and proxies for information uncertainty and 
information asymmetry. Last, according to an agency view of tax avoidance, information 
uncertainty and information asymmetry might also arise from investor perceptions about 
increased agency costs associated with tax risk.16 Since information uncertainty and 
information asymmetry are associated with a higher cost of equity capital (Lang and Maffett 
2011; Leuz and Wysocki 2008; Healy and Palepu 2001), it follows that tax risk should be 
associated with a higher cost of capital through its impact on these two constructs. Investors 
of tax risky firms will require a higher rate of return to compensate for the information 
uncertainty and information asymmetry generated from uncertain tax positions, increased 
organizational complexity, and increased agency costs. 
H2: There is a positive association between tax risk and the implied cost of equity capital. 
If tax risk is not associated with firm value (H1), then I do not expect an association 
between tax risk and the cost of capital. Results consistent with H1 but not H2 imply that tax 
                                                 
 
15 It could be argued that this particular source of information uncertainty is captured by the probability of 
disallowance (p) in the numerator of equation (2). I argue that tax risk affects investor perceptions of both the 
probability of disallowance (p) and also the dispersion of possible outcomes around (p), which reflects a 
denominator effect. 
16 Although Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and Koester (2011) both allude to a numerator effect of increased 
agency costs, I predict a denominator effect consistent with other studies that refer to a price discount or a cost 




risk affects firm value through its impact on investor estimations of future cash flows but not 
through the discount rate. It is possible that uncertainty about tax outcomes, increased 
organizational complexity, and increased managerial opportunism associated with tax risk 
impact the numerator of equation (2) rather than the denominator, indicating that investors 
actually change their estimation of future cash flows rather than applying a higher discount 
rate. However, this would seem to contradict prior literature which finds a positive 
association between information uncertainty and the cost of equity capital. 
If investors discount firm value due to information uncertainty and information 
asymmetry induced by tax risk, governance should attenuate this association to the extent 
better governed firms are more equipped to manage risks and restrain managers from 
engaging in excessive tax risk. Investors of well governed firms should also have less 
concern about increased managerial diversion because governance acts as a monitor to 
restrain managers. Investors should be willing to bear more risk since the associated costs of 
tax risk are lower in the presence of good governance. Therefore, the optimal level, where the 
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs, should be higher for better governed firms since 
information uncertainty and asymmetry costs are lower. This leads to my third and fourth 
hypotheses: 
H3a: The implied average optimal level of tax risk is higher for well governed firms 
than for poorly governed firms. 
 
H3b: The positive association between tax risk and the implied cost of equity capital 





3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Tax Risk and Firm Value  
To examine the association between tax risk and firm value (H1), I estimate the 
following equation: 
_ _ , , _ , , ,  (10)
 
LOG_MKT_VALUEi,t17 = natural log of the market value of equity on the first  
    business day after the 10-K filing date with available data 
following Koester (2011); 
TAXRISKi,t   = the balance of the tax reserve (liability for uncertain tax 
 positions under FIN 48) at time t scaled by total assets and  
multiplied by 100; 
TAXRISK_SQi,t  = TAXRISK squared; 
DISCR_ACCRUALSi,t = pre-tax, performance adjusted discretionary accruals 
following Frank et al. (2009); 
FOREIGN_INCOMEi,t = absolute value of pre-tax foreign income or loss scaled by 
total assets; 
NOLi,t    = tax loss carry-forward scaled by total assets, or zero if  
    missing; 
LT_DEBTi,t   = sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by 
 total assets; 
SALES_GROWTHi,t  = average percentage change in sales over the last three years; 
LOSSi,t   = indicator equal to 1 if the current year income before  
    extraordinary items is less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
STD_DEV_RETURNSi,t = standard deviation of monthly returns for the last five years 
 requiring data for at least 24 out of the last 60 months; 
LOG_AGEi,t   = natural log of the age of the firm measured using the number 
    of years the firm has been covered by CRSP. 
  
I use the ending balance in the tax reserve as my proxy for TAXRISK rather than the 
change in total reserve or the change in a specific component of the tax reserve. The ending 
                                                 
 
17 The concave association between TAXRISK and firm value is robust to the following alternative 
specifications of firm value:  raw market value of equity, market value of equity scaled by assets, log of the 
market value of equity scaled by assets, log of the market value of equity using CRSP prices (the main 
specification uses Compustat prices), Tobin’s Q following the specification in Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) 
that excludes deferred taxes to avoid a mechanical association, and Tobin’s Q using the standard Kaplan and 




balance is most appropriate in this setting because it reflects the firm’s overall cumulative 
exposure to the additional costs associated with tax risk.  I expect β1 to be positive and β2 to 
be negative if the association between tax risk and firm value is concave (H1).  
I rely on literature examining the association between tax avoidance and/or 
governance and firm value (Adams and Santos 2006; Brown and Caylor 2006; Cheng et al. 
2011; Desai and Dharmapala 2009a; Song and Tucker 2008; Wang 2010) to determine a set 
of control variables expected to be associated with firm value. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. I also include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects based on the Fama-
French twelve industry classification and cluster standard errors by firm.  
It is possible that TAXRISK is endogenous due to measurement error from its 
susceptibility to manipulation, reverse causality, or an un-measurable omitted variable that 
impacts both TAXRISK and firm value. I test for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test applied to an instrumental variables estimation. However it is difficult to find 
any instrument that is strongly associated with tax risk but not firm value except through its 
impact on tax risk and the other variables in the model (Adams and Santos 2006).  
The lagged value of an endogenous variable can be an appropriate instrument, 
especially in cases of measurement error (Klassen and Laplante 2011; Greene 2003). Klassen 
and Laplante (2011) argue that “lagged values are good instruments if the underlying 
construct is more persistent” (p.16). I contend that tax risk is relatively persistent since 
managers typically engage in long-term tax planning efforts and employ similar tax strategies 
from year to year. The correlation coefficient between TAXRISK and its lag is 0.87 




To test for endogeneity I estimate model (10) using two-stage least squares where the 
first stage model is TAXRISK regressed on the lagged value of TAXRISK (and all the other 
control variables). The partial F test for the lagged value of tax risk in this first stage 
regression is statistically significant at 1575.36 and the R2 of the model is 0.78 which 
suggests the lag is a strong instrument.18 I substitute the predicted value of TAXRISK and the 
square of the predicted value into model (10). Wooldridge (2010) explains that this procedure 
does not produce consistent estimators since the square of the linear predicted value of tax 
risk is not the same as the predicted value of the square of tax risk. To correct for the 
inconsistency, I use Stata’s bootstrapping option which produces standard errors by taking a 
number of different random samples from the data and re-estimating the parameters. Then a 
standard error is calculated as the sample standard deviation of the various estimates of the 
parameters (Wooldridge 2009). Wooldridge (2009) explains that bootstrapping is useful in 
various situations where the typical formulas for standard errors are not appropriate. 
Applying the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to this two-stage least squares estimation, I 
am unable to reject the null hypotheses that the regressors are exogenous. Although the 
results suggest endogeneity is not a concern, the validity of this test relies on good 
instruments. To the extent the lagged value of TAXRISK does not meet the requirements of a 
valid instrument, the test could be mis-specified. I provide results using both OLS and two-
stage least squares. In addition, I estimate model (10) substituting lagged values of 
TAXRISK and TAXRISK_SQ for the contemporaneous values. This specification corrects 
for reverse causality since the prior year’s tax reserve is not determined by the current year’s 
                                                 
 




market value, but it does not correct for measurement error since any measurement error in 
TAXRISK should also affect the lag. 
Tax Risk and Cost of Equity Capital (H2) 
To examine the association between tax risk and cost of equity capital (H2), I 
estimate the following equation: 
, , , ,
_ _ , , _ ,
_ _ , ,  
(11)
where r is the implied cost of equity capital on the closest IBES statistical period date 
occurring after the 10-K filing date. Botosan et al. (2011) test the construct validity of several 
of the literature’s proxies for implied cost of equity capital. They find validity for only two 
measures, rPEG and rDIV and recommend researchers use these measures. Both measures are 
derived from a dividend discount model and a series of assumptions about abnormal earnings 
and earnings growth. RPEG is the Price to Earnings-Growth ratio derived in Easton (2004) and 
rDIV relies on the target price method from Botosan and Plumlee (2002). The two measures 
are defined in Appendix A, and I follow the Botosan et al. (2011) specification for both. 
 I control for BETA, the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts divided by 
the absolute value of the mean analyst forecast (DISPERSION), the book to market ratio 
(BOOK_TO_MARKET), LEVERAGE, LOG_ASSETS, and the analyst consensus long-term 
growth forecast (LT_GROWTH_PRED) following Ghoul et al. (2011). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. I include year and industry fixed effects and cluster standard errors 




Governance Cross Sectional Analyses (H3a and H3b) 
To test whether the implied optimal level of tax risk is higher for well governed firms 
(H3a), I include a proxy for governance and interact it with both TAXRISK and 
TAXRISK_SQ. Similarly, I include each governance variable and its corresponding 
interaction in model (11) to examine whether the effect of tax risk on the cost of capital is 
attenuated by governance (H3b).  
Results from these analyses are likely sensitive to the type of governance measure 
used. Desai and Dharmapala (2009a) and Chyz et al. (2011) find that institutional ownership 
and institutional ownership turnover are significant mitigating factors on the relation between 
tax avoidance and firm value. I use the percentage of shares held by institutional owners to 
control for monitoring of managerial behavior. I specify INST_OWN as 1 when the 
institutional ownership is greater than the sample mean of 67.0 percent and designate these as 
“well-governed” firms following Desai and Dharmapala (2009a). If investors of better 
monitored firms are less concerned about the potential agency costs of tax risk, then better 
monitored firms should have a higher implied optimal level of tax risk (H3a) and a weaker 
association between tax risk and the cost of capital (H3b).  
While institutional owners may have greater incentives to monitor managerial 
behavior (Desai and Dharmapala 2009a), they also have different risk preferences. A higher 
implied optimal level of tax risk for firms with high levels of institutional ownership might 
reflect differences in risk preferences. Researchers have highlighted differences in tax 
aggressiveness driven by varying risk preferences (Badertscher et al. 2011; Chyz et al. 2011; 




To supplement the governance analysis, I also employ a proxy for managerial 
entrenchment. Rego and Wilson (2011) argue that proxies for managerial entrenchment are 
most consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance from Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
because managers who are insulated from removal are more likely to engage in diversion. 
Following Rego and Wilson (2011), I use an indicator variable equal to zero when the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board of directors (CEO_CHAIRMAN), which suggests increased 
managerial entrenchment. If investors believe entrenched managers are more likely to engage 
in diversion, then firms with a CEO who is not the chair should have a higher implied 
optimal level of tax risk (H3a) and a smaller association between tax risk and cost of equity 





4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 All tables are included in Appendix B. Table 1, Panel A outlines the sample selection. 
I start with all firm-years ending between December 16, 2007 (the effective date for FIN 48) 
and July 31, 2011 that are included in the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database.  I exclude 
foreign firms, subsidiaries of other firms, utilities (SIC code 49), and financial services firms 
(SIC codes 60-69).  I eliminate firms with a missing 10-K filing date, negative stockholder’s 
equity, missing tax reserve data, and missing control variables. The full sample consists of 
5,947 firm-year observations across five years.  For the firm value regressions (H1 and H3a), 
I also require observations to have the lagged value of TAXRISK since it is used as an 
instrument in the two-stage least squares estimation.  The final sample for the firm value 
regressions consists of 4,128 firm-year observations, which represents 1,784 unique firms 
across four years. For the cost of capital regressions (H2 and H3b), I require the necessary 
data to calculate the cost of capital estimates as well as additional control variables. The final 
sample for the cost of capital regressions consists of 2,273 firm-year observations, which 
represents 1,174 unique firms across four years. Table 1, Panel B contains an industry 
breakout of the firm value sample based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The 
highest concentration of firm-years is in the Business Equipment industry with 26.4 percent.  
This industry also has the highest average TAXRISK at 2.3 percent of assets. 
 Table 1, Panel C contains descriptive statistics for variables of interest and variables 
entering the models. The average tax reserve balance is about $58.2 million but the median is 
about $4.8 million suggesting some subset of firms with extremely large tax reserves. 




assets. The descriptive statistics for the tax reserve variables are very similar to Koester’s 
(2011) sample which comes from Compustat and Cazier et al.’s (2011) sample which is hand 
collected from the income tax footnotes. Table 2, Panel A provides correlations for variables 





5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Tax Risk and Firm Value (H1) 
Table 3 contains results from estimating model (10). I present the results excluding 
the squared term (col. 1), using OLS (col. 2), using OLS and a lagged value of tax risk (col. 
3), and using the instrumental variables with bootstrapping method discussed in Section 3 
(col. 4). Consistent with prior studies (Koester 2011; Song and Tucker 2008), I find a 
positive association between tax risk and market value when I exclude the squared term (col. 
1). The similarity between the results using the quadratic OLS model (col. 2) and the lagged 
model (col. 3) suggests reverse causality is not a strong concern in this model.  
I find evidence in support of H1 across all three specifications that employ a squared 
term (cols. 2-4). The positive coefficient on TAXRISK and the negative coefficient on 
TAXRISK_SQ indicate a concave association between tax risk and firm value. These results 
suggest equity investors value tax risk at a decreasing rate until the optimal level is reached, 
at which point increased tax risk is detrimental to equity valuation of the firm.  
 Following Adams and Santos (2006) I provide the argmax of each estimation and the 
percent of observations below the argmax. The argmax represents the average implied 
optimal level of tax risk in this particular sample of firms using the given model 
specification. It is calculated by taking the partial derivative of model (10) with respect to 
TAXRISK, setting it equal to zero, and solving for the optimal level. The result is 
TAXRISK*=β1 / (-2*β2). The average implied optimal TAXRISK ranges from 6.0 percent of 
assets using the IV with bootstrapping method (col. 4) to 6.3 percent using the lagged model 




suggests that most firms can afford to engage in riskier tax planning from an equity valuation 
standpoint.19  
Row (c) of Table 3 shows the increase in tax reserves necessary for the average firm 
to adjust to the implied optimal level.  This analysis is based only on those firms that are 
below the average optimal level.  For the average firm below the optimal level, equity 
investors would be willing to bear at least $200.5 million more in total tax reserves. The last 
row (d) of Table 3 contains the cumulative increase that would be required in this sample to 
increase all firms from their current level of tax risk to the average implied optimal level. In 
the quadratic OLS specification (col. 2), for example, if all firms were to adjust their tax 
reserves as a percentage of assets to the optimal level, it would require a cumulative net 
increase of $753.9 billion in tax reserves. These results demonstrate that the extent of less-
than-optimal tax behavior is economically important. 
These results must be interpreted with caution. I do not assert that the optimal level of 
tax risk for all firms is any particular number, that the optimal level is only a function of 
equity investor preferences, or that all firms should adjust to the average optimal level of tax 
risk. The argmax is an estimate of the average implied optimal level of tax risk based on this 
specific sample of firms and their equity investors’ preferences. Since different types of 
stakeholders will have different risk preferences, and each firm has a unique mix of 
stakeholders, there is not one optimal level of tax risk. Certainly the true optimal level of tax 
risk for each firm depends on other stakeholders and other factors beyond the equity 
                                                 
 
19 It is not surprising that prior research has often found a positive linear association between tax risk and firm 
value given that the association is positive for most firms since they are below the optimal level. However, 
linear models fail to account for the diminishing rate of the positive impact of tax risk on firm value until the 




valuation. Managers will engage in less tax risk than what is preferred by equity investors if 
managers’ perceptions of the associated costs are higher than investors’ perceptions of those 
same costs. Also, the argmax is based on the estimated parameters of the model which may 
not equate to the true values of these parameters if the model is mis-specified. Nevertheless, 
these results suggest that the equity stakeholders perceive important benefits to tax risk and 
the potential impacts on firm value are economically significant.20  
Tax Risk and Cost of Equity Capital (H2) 
 The results of estimating model (11) using both rPEG and rDIV are shown in Table 4. 
The control variables are in the direction predicted by the literature and the same as in Ghoul 
et al. (2011) although most are not significantly different from zero in the rDIV model (col. 2). 
TAXRISK is weakly significant and positive in both specifications suggesting that investors 
require a higher rate of return in the presence of riskier tax strategies to compensate for 
increased information asymmetry and/or information uncertainty.  This result provides some 
evidence that tax risk increases the equity cost of capital (H2) but additional research is 
warranted since this is the first study to examine the association between tax reserves and the 
cost of capital.  Nevertheless, this result is important because it points to a more complicated 
relation between firm value and tax risk than has previously been explored.  Tax risk impacts 
not only expectations about future cash flows but also the discount rate applied to those 
                                                 
 
20 This analysis assumes managers comply with FIN 48 by appropriately recording and disclosing their 
contingent tax liabilities. An alternative explanation is that managers do not comply sufficiently with FIN 48 in 





expectations.  Future work in this area should consider the implications from both aspects of 
this association. 
Tax Risk, Firm Value, and Governance (H3a)  
 Table 5 contains the results of estimating model (10) with a control for governance 
and an interaction of governance with TAXRISK and TAXRISK_SQ. Column 1 shows the 
results when governance is defined using an indicator for institutional ownership levels 
above the sample mean and column 2 uses CEO/chair duality. The control variable 
coefficients have been suppressed but are consistent with results in Table 3.21 TAXRISK and 
TAXRISK_SQ are significant in the predicted directions indicating the concave relation 
between tax risk and firm value holds with the inclusion of a governance control. 
 In rows (a) and (b) of Table 5, I calculate the implied average optimal level of tax risk 
for well governed firms and for poorly governed firms by setting the first partial derivative 
equal to zero and evaluating it when GOVERNANCE=1 and GOVERNANCE=0, 
respectively. Using the Delta method, I test the nonlinear hypothesis that these two values are 
equal. As shown, the implied optimal level in firms with high levels of institutional 
ownership (col. 1) is not statistically different from the optimal level in firms with low levels 
of institutional ownership (p-value=0.296). This result is not consistent with H3a and 
suggests that investors of firms with higher levels of institutional ownership are not 
necessarily willing to bear more tax risk, on average, than investors of firms with lower 
levels of institutional ownership. 
                                                 
 




 This result does not mean that institutional ownership has no impact on the relation 
between tax risk and firm value. In fact, the effect of governance on this association can only 
be determined by evaluating the results at a given level of TAXRISK. The differential impact 
governance has on this relation is determined by the linear combination of β4 + 
2*β5*TAXRISK. In the institutional ownership specification (col. 1), this linear combination 
is (untabulated) negative and significant when TAXRISK is less than 1.3 percent and positive 
and significant at levels greater than 7.8 percent (and not significant otherwise). For those 
firms with TAXRISK less than 1.3 percent (68.0 percent of my sample), higher levels of 
institutional ownership attenuate the positive impact of tax risk on firm value suggesting that 
firms with less institutional ownership have more to gain from increases in risky tax 
strategies. For firms with very high levels of tax risk, higher levels of institutional ownership 
reduce the negative impact on firm value. Thus, it seems, institutional ownership actually 
does moderate the association between tax risk and firm value even if the average optimal 
level implied by this specification does not differ based on level of institutional ownership.  
In the CEO/chair duality specification (col. 2), I find results consistent with H3b. 
Firms with a CEO who is also the chairman of the board have an average optimal level of 4.9 
percent of assets while other firms have an average optimal level of 7.7 percent. The 
difference between the two is statistically significant which suggests that investors of firms 
where the CEO is more insulated from removal are willing to bear less tax risk. Perhaps 
investors perceive higher agency costs associated with tax risk when the CEO is protected 
from removal consistent with an agency view of tax avoidance. These higher agency costs 




Tax Risk, Cost of Equity Capital, and Governance (H3b) 
 Table 6 contains the results from estimating model (11) with interactions of 
governance with TAXRISK using both institutional ownership and CEO/chair duality. 
Institutional ownership and CEO/chair duality do not have an independent effect on the cost 
of equity capital but TAXRISK remains positively associated with the cost of capital in all 
specifications except the rPEG model using CEO/chair duality as the proxy for governance 
(col. 2). I find evidence in support of H3b in only one of the four specifications. In the rDIV 
specification (col. 3), TAXRISK has a statistically significant impact of the cost of capital 
only in firms with low levels of institutional ownership, consistent with such investors 
requiring a higher rate of return to compensate for increased agency costs and/or information 
uncertainty that arises from tax risk.22 Investors of firms with high levels of institutional 
ownership do not appear to require such a premium either because they believe such firms 
can better manage risk or because these firms have good monitoring in place to restrain the 
managerial diversion afforded by tax risk.  These results should be interpreted cautiously 
since the rPEG model does not corroborate the findings.  I am unable to document evidence of 
a cross sectional difference in the association between tax risk and the cost of capital due to 
CEO/ chair duality. 
  
                                                 
 
22 The coefficient for well governed firms is 0.002 (but not statistically different from zero) and for poorly 
governed firms is 0.007.  The interaction term (coefficient=-0.005) suggests the difference between the two 
groups is statistically significant. In the CEO/chair duality specification (col. 4), the effect for well governed 
firms is 0.008 and for poorly governed firms is 0.004.  However this difference is not statistically significant as 




6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
Industry-Adjusted Tax Risk 
 Given that firms in the same industry tend to engage in the same type of tax 
strategies, investors may assess firm-specific tax risk in relation to firms in the same industry. 
To examine this possibility, I calculate an industry-adjusted TAXRISK by subtracting the 
median for each firm’s industry-year, based on two-digit SIC codes, from the TAXRISK 
value of the firm. All results are robust to the industry-adjusted variable except the 
coefficient on adjusted TAXRISK is not significant in the rPEG model that examines 
institutional ownership (Table 6, col. 1).  A positive average optimum would imply that, on 
average, investors prefer firms that are tax-riskier (i.e. more tax aggressive) than the median 
firm. The main results from this analysis suggest the average implied optimal level of 
TAXRISK is 5.4 percentage points greater than the industry median consistent with a 
positive valuation of tax risky firms and a concave association between firm value and 
industry-adjusted tax risk.   
Sample Partitions 
 To investigate whether the results in Table 3 are driven by the influence of a 
particular subset of firms within the sample, I run separate regressions after excluding the top 
decile of TAXRISK observations. The concave association between tax risk and firm value 
persists. The average optimal level after excluding the top decile firms is 2.1 percent of 
assets, substantially lower than the 6.1 percent optimal level shown in Table 3, column 2. 




many firms, the true optimal level is lower than what is suggested by an average optimal 
level that accounts for all firms in the sample. The evidence continues to point to a lack of 
excessive risk taking in the context of tax planning since 89.8 percent of the reduced sample 
observations have a TAXRISK value less than 2.1 percent. The top decile alone does not 
result in a sample large enough to yield statistically significant coefficients on TAXRISK and 
TAXRISK_SQ so I am unable to accurately interpret the average optimal level for this 
particular subset of firms. 
 To further analyze these differences, I compare the firms in the top tenth of 
TAXRISK to all the other observations in my sample. Table 7 provides t-tests of the 
differences across all variables used in model (10). As shown, risky tax firms tend to have 
more foreign sales, more net operating losses, less long-term debt, more volatility, and lower 
sales growth. High TAXRISK firms also tend to be younger firms and are more likely to be 
in a current year loss position.  
Higher Order Polynomials 
I also examine the possibility that the true association between tax risk and firm value 
is a higher order polynomial function. I successively add higher order TAXRISK variables to 
model (10) beginning with a cubed term until the coefficients on these terms are no longer 
statistically significant at conventional levels. All TAXRISK coefficients continue to be 
highly significant until addition of the seventh power, in which case only TAXRISK and 
TAXRISK_SQ remain significant. Figure 1 depicts the association between tax risk and firm 
value using the results of estimating model (10) as a sixth order polynomial function of 




percent of assets, relatively similar to the main result of 6.1 percent of assets (Table 3, col. 2).  
However, there appears to be another local maximum at 11.4 percent of assets. The graph 
suggests over 95.0 percent of firms in the sample (those with a TAXRISK less than 5.4 
percent) are below the average optimal level and could likely expect increases in tax risk to 
improve firm value, all else constant. Consistent with my main results, for most firms, value 
is increasing in tax risk at a decreasing (although not constant) rate up to some optimum and 
decreasing in tax risk beyond that optimal level. However, for those firms with very high 
levels of TAXRISK (above 9.3), increases in risky tax strategies might actually improve firm 
value. These results provide further evidence that the relation between tax risk and firm value 
is extremely complex. Nevertheless, for most firms, the sixth order polynomial function 
corroborates the main findings using a simpler quadratic model which suggests the quadratic 
version may be a more efficient tool for future research. 
Other Robustness Checks 
The results of Table 3 using the quadratic OLS specification are also robust to the 
following alternative specifications: 1) dropping all firm-years with a current year loss (1,273 
observations), 2) dropping all firm-years where TAXRISK equals zero (399 observations), 3) 
inclusion of a variable to control for stock option compensation, 4) inclusion of research and 
development expenses scaled by assets, 5) replacing STD_DEV_RETURNS with BETA, 6) 
inclusion of a binary proxy for merger and acquisition activity based on the Compustat 
footnote codes for the sale variable, and 7) inclusion of a control for intangible assets and 







 I investigate whether there is an optimal level of tax risk from an equity valuation 
standpoint. Using the tax reserve disclosed under FIN 48 to proxy for tax risk, I find a 
concave association between tax risk and firm value consistent with an optimal level of tax 
risk. These results indicate that investors value tax risk up to some level, at which point the 
costs become too excessive and increases in tax risk are detrimental to firm value. The 
average implied optimal level of tax risk in my sample ranges from a tax reserve balance of 
6.0 percent of assets to 6.3 percent of assets. I do not find evidence of excessive risk taking in 
the context of tax avoidance. Instead almost all firms in my sample are below the average 
optimal level and it would take at least $733 billion in cumulative increases in tax reserves to 
get all firms to the optimal level. The average implied optimal level of tax risk from an equity 
valuation standpoint tends to be higher for firms with lower levels of managerial 
entrenchment indicating that investors of these firms are willing to bear more tax risk. The 
average optimal level does not vary with the level of institutional ownership although 
institutional ownership moderates the association between tax risk and firm value. 
 I also document a positive association between equity cost of capital and tax risk 
which indicates that at least part of the association between tax risk and firm value is driven 
by the discount rate applied to expectations about future cash flows. Consistent with an 
agency view of tax avoidance, investors likely require a higher rate of return in tax risky 
firms to compensate for additional agency costs associated with tax risk. The evidence is 
mixed on whether the positive association between tax risk and the cost of equity capital is 




 My study is limited by the specific sample of firms employed and the time period of 
available data. My estimates of the implied optimal level of tax risk cannot necessarily be 
applied to other firms during other time periods but provide some evidence about the 
economic magnitude of the shortage of tax risky behavior from an equity investor standpoint. 
My sample period is marked by severe economic downturns making it less generalizable than 
samples spanning longer time windows. These results should also be interpreted cautiously 
given that each firm has a different true optimal level of tax risk based on its various 
stakeholders’ preferences and its managers’ concerns. Lastly, to the extent that managers do 
not fully comply with FIN 48 in reporting tax reserves, my results might be indicative of 
under-reserving rather than a shortage of tax risk. Nevertheless, the results strongly suggest 
there is an optimal level of tax risk from an equity valuation standpoint, although it is 
different for every firm. These results are not consistent with excessive risk taking in the 
context of tax avoidance, and the economic magnitudes I report corroborate prior concerns 
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All continuous variables winsorized at one and ninety-nine percent unless otherwise noted. CRSP, Compustat, 
and  IBES variable names in parentheses. 
Variables in Firm Value Model (10)  
LOG_MKT_VALUE Natural log of the market value of equity in millions using the Compustat daily price 
(prccd) and shares outstanding (cshoc) on the first business day (within 5 days) after 
the 10-K filing date with available price data from Compustat.  Observations where 
the filing date was greater than 150 days after the fiscal year end were deleted. 
TAXRISK The balance of the tax reserve (liability for uncertain tax positions under FIN 48) 
(txtubend) at time t scaled by total assets (at), mutiplied by 100 to get the actual 
percent. 
TAXRISK_SQ TAXRISK squared. 
DISCR_ACCRUALS Pre-tax, performance adjusted discretionary accruals following Frank et al. (2009). I 
estimate the following modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) by two digit SIC 
code and fiscal year for all U.S. firms in compustat with positive total stockholders’ 
equity except for utilities, financial services, and subsidiaries of other companies, 
requiring each regression to have at least 10 firm-year observations. 
TACCit=α0 + α1(ΔREVit – ΔARit) + α2PPEit + ηit  
All variables are scaled by beginning of year assets (at) and winsorized at 1 and 99 
percent, and TACCit=(EBEIit + TTEit) – [(CFOit + ITPit) – EIDOit]. 
EBEIit = earnings before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flow for 
firm i in year t (ibc); 
TTEit = total tax expense for firm i in year t (txt); 
CFOit = cash flow from operations for firm i in year t (oancf); 
ITPit = income taxes paid from the statement of cash flow for firm i in year t (txpd); 
EIDOit = extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the statement of cash 
for firm i in year t (xidoc); 
ΔREVit = change in sales (revt) for firm i from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔARit = change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t (-1*recch); 
PPEit = gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t (ppegt); and ηit = 
discretionary accruals for firm i in year t before adjusting for performance. 
Following Frank et al. (2009) I calculate accruals on a pre-tax basis as shown above.  
After obtaining discretionary accruals for each firm year, I match each firm-year by 
industry and by decile of current pre-tax return on assets (PTROA=pi/lag at). For 
each industry-PTROA decile, the median observation is excluded. For all other 
observations, DISCR_ACCRUALS is the difference between η and the median η for 
the industry-PTROA decile group. 
FOREIGN_INCOME Absolute value of pre-tax foreign income or loss (pifo), scaled by ending total assets 
(at) at time t, or 0 if missing. 
NOL Tax loss carryforward (tlcf), scaled by ending total assets (at) at time t, or 0 if 
missing.  
LT_DEBT Long term debt (dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (dlc) at time t, scaled by ending 
total assets (at) at time t. 
SALES_GROWTH The 3 year average of the percentage growth in sales (sale) for years t, t-1, and t-2. 
LOSS Indicator equal to 1 if current year income before extraordinary items (ib) is less 







Variables in Firm Value Model (10) Continued 
STD_DEV_RETURNS The standard deviation of CRSP monthly returns (ret) for the last five years ending 
in year t, where each firm-year is required to have 24 out of 60 months of available 
return data. 
LOG_AGE Natural log of the age of the firm, measured as the number of years the firm has 
been covered by CRSP. 
 
 
Variables in Cost of Capital Model (11) 
rPEG Following Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan et al. (2011): rPEG=((eps5-
eps4)/P0)^(.5).  Eps5 (eps4) is the 5 (4) year ahead analyst consensus median forecast 
of earnings on the closest IBES statistical period date (statpers) after the 10-K filing 
date. P0 is the price from the Compustat daily security file (prccd) on the same day or 
within three days.  I require eps5>eps4. If eps5 is missing then I calculate it as 
eps4*(1+LT_GROWTH_PRED). If eps4 is missing then I calculate it as 
eps3*(1+LT_GROWTH_PRED).   
rDIV Following Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Botosan et al. (2011): rDIV solves the 
following equation: P0=∑[(1+rDIV)^-t * dpst]  + [(1+rDIV)^-5 * P5] for time periods t=1 
through t=5. Dpst is the tth-year ahead analyst consensus median forecast of 
dividends on the closest IBES statistical period date (statpers) after the 10-K filing 
date.  P0 is the price from the Compustat daily security file (prccd) on the same day 
or within 3 days. P5 is the mean of the minimum (ptglow) and maximum (ptghigh) 
target price estimates from IBES.  
BETA The coefficient on monthly returns (ret) from regressing CRSP monthly returns on 
the value weighted market index (vwretd) NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq for the last five 
years ending in year t, where each firm-year is required to have 24 out of 60 months 
of available return data. 
DISPERSION The standard deviation of one year ahead earnings forecasts for the current fiscal year 
t made within ninety days prior to the earnings announcement date, scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean consensus analyst forecast for the current fiscal year.  
BOOK_TO_MARKET Book value of equity divided by market value of equity (prcc_f*csho) at time t 
following the Ghoul et al. (2011) specification.  Book value is shareholders equity 
(seq) plus deferred taxes (txdb) and investment tax credits (itcb) (if available) less the 
book value of preferred stock. Book value of preferred stock is defined using either 
the redemption (pstkr), liquidation (pstkl), or par value (pstk) (in that order) when 
available. 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt (dltt) divided by market value at year end (prcc_f*csho). 
LOG_ASSETS Natural log of assets (at) at time t. 
LT_GROWTH_PRED Mean long-term growth earnings forecast from IBES in June of the current fiscal year 
t. If the long-term growth prediction is missing, I calculate it as (eps5-eps4)/abs(eps4) 







CEO_CHAIRMAN Indicator equal to 0 if the CEO is also listed as the chairman of the board of directors 
in Risk Metrics; equal to 1 if the firm is covered by Risk Metrics but the CEO is not 
the chairman; otherwise set to missing. 
INST_OWN Indicator equal to 1 if the percentage of shares held by institutional owners is greater 
than the sample mean; 0 otherwise. Data are from Thomson-Reuters 13F Data (TR-
13F) as of the closest 13-F filing date that occurs before the 10-K filing, in all cases 
within the previous 365 days. Following Khurana and Moser (2009) I winsorize the 




















Table 1: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
CRSP/Compustat Merged U.S. firm-year observations during sample period 22,485
   Less: utilities and financial services (10,026)
   Less: observations with negative total stockholder's equity (626)
   Less: observations where filing date is missing or greater than 150 days after year end* (73)
   Less: observations with missing tax reserve data (4,211)
   Less: observations with missing control variables (1,602)
Preliminary Sample 5,947 
Sample for H1: Firm Value Regressions 
Preliminary Sample 5,947 
   Less: observations with missing lagged tax reserve data for IV estimation (1,819)
Final Sample For Firm Value Regressions (Tables 3 and 5) 4,128 
Sample for H2: Cost of Capital Regressions 
Preliminary Sample 5,947 
   Less: observations with missing cost of capital estimates (1,446)
   Less: observations with missing control variables (2,228)
Final Sample For Cost of Capital Regressions (Tables 4 and 6) 2,273 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 






Consumer NonDurables 243 5.9 1.4%
Consumer Durables 116 2.8 1.3%
Manufacturing 622 15.1 1.2%
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 205 5.0 0.5%
Chemicals and Allied Products 142 3.4 1.0%
Business Equipment 1,088 26.4 2.3%
Telephone and Television Transmission 145 3.5 1.1%
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 528 12.8 0.8%
Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 510 12.3 1.3%




*The market value calculation requires a price around the date of the 10-K filing. I exclude firms where the 10-
K filing occurs greater than 150 days after the fiscal year end since these firms would be considered late in their 




Table 1: Continued 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 25th 50th 75th Max 
Variables of Interest 
Assets (millions) 4,128 3,996.9 10,340.9 13.0 220.3 747.2 2,556.4 69,588.0
Market value (millions) 4,128 3,935.2 11,625.4 6.8 165.9 618.9 2,241.8 89,732.2
Ending reserve (millions) 4,128 58.18 194.04 0.00 0.79 4.80 25.19 1,483.00
Variables in Firm Value Models (Tables 3 and 5) 
LOG_MKT_VALUE 4,128 6.42 1.98 1.91 5.11 6.43 7.72 11.40
TAXRISK* 4,128 1.37 2.00 0.00 0.21 0.68 1.65 11.70
DISCR_ACCRUALS 4,128 0.00 0.08 -0.27 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.25
FOREIGN_INCOME 4,128 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.20
NOL 4,128 0.21 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 4.42
LT_DEBT 4,128 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.29 0.70
SALES_GROWTH 4,128 0.10 0.24 -0.28 -0.02 0.05 0.15 1.54
LOSS 4,128 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
STD_DEV_RETURNS 4,128 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.26
LOG_AGE 4,128 2.73 0.82 0.85 2.28 2.75 3.29 4.42
Variables in Cost of Capital Models (Tables 4 and 6) 
RPEG 2,273 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.14 1.18
RDIV 617 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.28
BETA 2,273 1.33 0.63 0.06 0.90 1.27 1.70 3.23
DISPERSION 2,273 0.17 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.09 4.24
BOOK_TO_MARKET 2,273 0.66 0.55 0.06 0.32 0.51 0.82 4.04
LEVERAGE 2,273 0.41 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.43 5.49
LOG_ASSETS 2,273 7.60 1.54 3.56 6.49 7.54 8.60 11.15
LT_GROWTH_PRED 2,273 0.18 0.24 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.19 2.33
Governance Variables 
CEO_CHAIRMAN 2,004 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
INST_OWN** 4,128 0.67 0.27 0.02 0.50 0.76 0.89 1.00
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at one and ninety-nine 
percent. TAXRISK, FOREIGN_INCOME, NOL and LT_DEBT are scaled by assets. Note that 
CEO_CHAIRMAN is coded as a 0 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board in order to make it consistent 
with INST_OWN where better governance is represented by a 1 rather than a 0.  
*TAXRISK is the ending tax reserve balance scaled by total assets and multipled by 100. 
**This is the continuous version of the variable. For regression analysis, INST_OWN is coded as 1 if the value 




Table 2: Spearman and Pearson Correlations 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Firm Value Regressions (H1 and H3a) 




















1.000 0.039 -0.124 0.250 -0.237 0.112 0.031 -0.403 -0.487 0.251 -0.226 0.491 
  0.013 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.044 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
TAXRISK 
0.212 1.000 -0.024 0.184 0.263 -0.163 -0.060 0.127 0.026 -0.003 0.026 0.033 
<.001   0.125 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.000 <.001 0.094 0.824 0.247 0.032 
DISCR_ 
ACCRUALS 
-0.120 -0.081 1.000 -0.045 0.094 -0.006 -0.057 -0.034 0.090 0.055 -0.061 -0.180 
<.001 <.001   0.004 <.001 0.683 0.000 0.029 <.001 0.000 0.006 <.001 
FOREIGN_ 
INCOME 
0.313 0.333 -0.038 1.000 -0.032 -0.062 0.020 -0.094 -0.083 0.121 -0.058 0.073 
<.001 <.001 0.014   0.040 <.001 0.202 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.010 <.001 
NOL 
-0.115 0.096 0.036 0.076 1.000 -0.105 0.095 0.270 0.263 -0.095 0.073 -0.193 
<.001 <.001 0.021 <.001   <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.001 <.001 
LT_DEBT 
0.186 -0.108 0.003 -0.026 0.013 1.000 -0.012 0.043 0.007 0.010 -0.073 0.065 
<.001 <.001 0.869 0.096 0.395   0.452 0.006 0.674 0.537 0.001 <.001 
SALES_ 
GROWTH 
0.130 -0.084 -0.127 0.014 -0.017 -0.030 1.000 -0.027 0.082 -0.230 -0.017 -0.028 
<.001 <.001 <.001 0.373 0.272 0.058   0.086 <.001 <.001 0.436 0.076 
LOSS 
-0.405 0.018 -0.027 -0.116 0.193 0.008 -0.175 1.000 0.360 -0.144 0.066 -0.224 
<.001 0.257 0.078 <.001 <.001 0.622 <.001   <.001 <.001 0.003 <.001 
STD_DEV_ 
RETURNS 
-0.493 -0.113 0.068 -0.151 0.199 -0.053 -0.038 0.368 1.000 -0.347 0.100 -0.302 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.001 0.014 <.001   <.001 <.001 <.001 
LOG_ 
AGE 
0.238 0.085 0.069 0.172 -0.082 0.078 -0.233 -0.145 -0.340 1.000 -0.112 0.085 
<.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   <.001 <.001 
CEO_ 
CHAIRMAN 
-0.223 -0.031 -0.059 -0.058 0.049 -0.090 -0.034 0.066 0.103 -0.119 1.000 -0.051 
<.001 0.164 0.008 0.009 0.028 <.001 0.127 0.003 <.001 <.001   0.022 
INST_ 
OWN 
0.520 0.153 -0.180 0.160 -0.064 0.106 0.054 -0.224 -0.297 0.083 -0.053 1.000 




Table 2: Continued 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Cost of Capital Regressions (H2 and H3b) 
Spearman below \ Pearson above (p-values shown below correlation coefficient) 
  













1.000 0.086 0.201 0.170 0.228 0.221 -0.135 0.246 0.056 -0.093 
  0.033 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.035 <.001 
rDIV 
0.102 1.000 0.145 0.025 0.256 0.302 0.040 0.026 -0.032 -0.018 
0.011   0.000 0.534 <.001 <.001 0.320 0.524 0.490 0.660 
BETA 
0.219 0.128 1.000 0.133 0.184 0.149 -0.175 0.120 0.042 -0.006 
<.001 0.001   <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.109 0.792 
DISPERSION 
0.102 0.035 0.310 1.000 0.192 0.185 -0.043 0.150 0.012 -0.048 
<.001 0.380 <.001   <.001 <.001 0.042 <.001 0.638 0.024 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 
0.082 0.154 0.224 0.296 1.000 0.545 0.008 -0.048 0.012 -0.055 
<.001 0.000 <.001 <.001   <.001 0.720 0.022 0.637 0.009 
LEVERAGE 
0.031 0.242 0.108 0.127 0.376 1.000 0.158 -0.033 -0.039 -0.068 
0.134 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   <.001 0.119 0.139 0.001 
LOG_ASSETS 
-0.177 0.117 -0.182 -0.118 0.023 0.421 1.000 -0.199 -0.197 0.126 
<.001 0.004 <.001 <.001 0.278 <.001   <.001 <.001 <.001 
LT_GROWTH_PRED 
0.303 0.051 0.166 0.091 -0.133 -0.279 -0.379 1.000 0.037 -0.119 
<.001 0.203 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001   0.161 <.001 
CEO_CHAIRMAN 
0.066 -0.056 0.034 0.029 0.005 -0.105 -0.196 0.104 1.000 0.014 
0.012 0.220 0.198 0.265 0.843 <.001 <.001 <.001   0.598 
INST_OWN 
-0.038 -0.050 0.012 -0.062 0.010 0.049 0.137 -0.049 0.014 1.000 








Table 3: Regressions of Log Market Value on TAXRISK (H1) 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       OLS Linear 
  
OLS 
Quadratic   
OLS Lag 
TAXRISK   
IV with 
Bootstrap 
TAXRISK 0.119*** 0.430*** 0.423*** 0.490*** 
(5.541) (9.427) (9.246) (13.506) 
TAXRISK_SQ -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.041*** 
(-7.677) (-7.533) (-9.849) 
DISCR_ACCRUALS -2.049*** -1.896*** -1.947*** -1.867*** 
(-6.409) (-5.818) (-6.015) (-6.067) 
FOREIGN_INCOME 9.061*** 7.884*** 7.915*** 7.313*** 
(9.756) (8.514) (8.538) (9.133) 
NOL -0.232*** -0.185*** -0.194*** -0.226*** 
(-4.602) (-3.473) (-3.748) (-5.592) 
LT_DEBT 1.577*** 1.616*** 1.590*** 1.696*** 
(7.889) (8.167) (7.999) (12.572) 
SALES_GROWTH 0.946*** 0.957*** 0.987*** 1.035*** 
(6.656) (6.691) (6.926) (9.549) 
LOSS -0.899*** -0.897*** -0.868*** -0.979*** 
(-12.799) (-13.112) (-12.696) (-13.452) 
STD_DEV_RETURNS -16.747*** -16.361*** -16.244*** -16.087*** 
(-19.793) (-19.530) (-19.378) (-25.426) 
LOG_AGE 0.167*** 0.152*** 0.147*** 0.159*** 
(3.597) (3.280) (3.189) (6.202) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.460 0.477 0.477 0.475 
N 4,128 4,128 4,128 4,128 
(a) Argmax (Implied Optimum) 6.1 6.3 6.0 
(b) Percent obs with TAXRISK<argmax 96.0% 96.2% 95.8% 
(c) Average shortage of tax reserves (millions) 206.1 213.8 200.5 
(d) Cumulative inc. in reserves (millions)  753,926  788,223   733,096 
 
This table presents results for tests of model (10). All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below each coefficient. ***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively, using a two tailed test of significance.  All standard errors are clustered by firm except for 
column 4 which uses boostrapped standard errors.  (a) is the average implied optimal level of TAXRISK, calculated as the 
coefficient on TAXRISK divided by -2 times the coefficient on TAXRISK_SQ. (b) is the percentage of observations in the 
sample that have a TAXRISK value below the argmax value. (c) is the difference between the argmax and average 
TAXRISK for those firms that are below the argmax, multiplied by the average level of assets, to get the average shortage in 
total tax reserves. (d) is the cumulative increase in total tax reserves required to get all firm-years to the argmax value of 




Table 4: Regressions of Cost of Capital on TAXRISK (H2) 
 
          (1)       (2) 
          rPEG       rDIV 
TAXRISK 0.003* 0.003* 
(1.768) (1.931) 
BETA 0.019*** 0.006 
(3.856) (1.606) 
DISPERSION 0.014* -0.005 
(1.645) (-1.223) 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 0.027** 0.012 
(2.325) (1.228) 
LEVERAGE 0.020*** 0.026** 
(2.655) (2.274) 
LOG_ASSETS -0.007*** 0.001 
(-4.360) (0.363) 
LT_GROWTH_PRED 0.102*** 0.011 
(3.652) (0.789) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.160 0.248 
N       2,273      617 
 
This table presents results for tests of model (11). All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient. ***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, using a two tailed test of significance. All standard 






Table 5: Regressions of Log Market Value on TAXRISK and Governance (H3a) 
 
    (1) (2) 
  
  GOVERNANCE=1 if INST_OWN > mean 
GOVERNANCE=1 if 
CEO is not the 
Chairman 
β1 TAXRISK 0.420*** 0.388*** 
(6.016) (5.499) 
β2 TAXRISK_SQ -0.037*** -0.040*** 
(-5.806) (-4.782) 
β3 GOVERNANCE 1.274*** -0.435*** 
(13.365) (-4.162) 
β4 TAXRISK_x_GOVERNANCE -0.141* -0.070 
(-1.759) (-0.732) 
β5 TAXRISK_SQ_x_GOVERNANCE 0.015* 0.019* 
(1.926) (1.768) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.546 0.484 
N 4,128 2,004 
(a) Argmax for well governed [(β1+β4)/(-2*(β2+β5))] 6.5 7.7 
(b) Argmax for poorly governed [β1/(-2*(β2))] 5.7 4.9 
(c) F-statistic for Delta Method nonlinear test 1.09 4.43** 
(d) p-value for difference in argmax 0.296 0.036 
 
This table presents results for tests of model (10) based on the interaction of either institutional ownership or 
CEO/ chairman duality with TAXRISK and TAXRISK_SQ.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. ***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively, using a two tailed test of significance. All 
standard errors are clustered by firm. 
(a) The optimal level of TAXRISK when GOVERNANCE=1 
(b) The optimal level of TAXRISK when GOVERNANCE=0  
(c) The F-statistic produced from the wald-type test of the null hypothesis that the implied argmax for well 
governed firms equals the implied argmax for poorly governed firms. The nonlinear test of parameters is 
performed using the Delta method. The null hypothesis is: [(β1+β4)/(-2*(β2+β5))]= [β1/(-2*(β2))].  




Table 6: Regressions of Cost of Capital on TAXRISK and Governance (H3b) 
 

















CEO is not 
the 
Chairman 
TAXRISK 0.007* 0.001 0.007*** 0.004*** 
(1.817) (1.046) (2.895) (2.621) 
GOVERNANCE -0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.006 
(-0.503) (1.014) (-0.201) (-0.895) 
TAXRISK_x_ 
GOVERNANCE 
-0.005 0.001 -0.005* 0.004 
(-1.303) (0.253) (-1.780) (1.019) 
BETA 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.007* 0.006 
(3.910) (2.646) (1.732) (1.322) 
DISPERSION 0.014 0.013 -0.004 -0.006 
(1.593) (1.303) (-1.210) (-1.292) 
BOOK_TO_ 
MARKET 
0.027** 0.002 0.013 0.011 
(2.303) (0.177) (1.280) (1.131) 
LEVERAGE 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.027** 0.026*** 
(2.645) (2.631) (2.320) (3.658) 
LOG_ASSETS -0.007*** -0.002 -0.000 0.004** 
(-4.361) (-1.493) (-0.042) (2.574) 
LT_GROWTH_ 
PRED 
0.100*** 0.062* 0.012 0.013 
(3.570) (1.926) (0.866) (0.831) 
Sum of coefficients on TAXRISK and TAXRISK_x_GOVERNANCE: 
Coefficient 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008** 
t-statistic (1.180) (0.660) (1.270) (2.060) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.161 0.107 0.253 0.267 
N 2,273 1,439 617 474 
 
This table presents results for tests of model (11) based on the interaction of either 
institutional ownership or CEO/ chairman duality with TAXRISK. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. ***,**,* indicate 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 




Table 7: Univariate Differences Between High and Low Tax Risk Firms 
 
  All Other Observations 
Top Decile 
of 
TAXRISK       
  Mean Mean Difference in groups 
t-test of 
difference p-value 
ASSETS 3,927.922 4,618.815 -690.893 -1.069 0.286 
     
LOG_MKT_VALUE 6.416 6.441 -0.025 -0.224 0.823 
     
DISCR_ACCRUALS -0.003 -0.009 0.006 1.110 0.268 
     
FOREIGN_INCOME 0.023 0.045 -0.022 -8.207*** 0.000 
     
NOL 0.161 0.647 -0.486 -8.034*** 0.000 
     
LT_DEBT 0.193 0.099 0.093 12.818*** 0.000 
     
SALES_GROWTH 0.098 0.071 0.026 1.972** 0.049 
     
LOSS 0.290 0.471 -0.181 -7.028*** 0.000 
     
STD_DEV_RETURNS 0.136 0.143 -0.008 -3.223*** 0.001 
     
LOG_AGE 2.738 2.622 0.116 2.911*** 0.004 
     
N 3,716 412       
 
This table presents t-tests of means across variables used for model (10). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. ***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 







Figure 1: Firm Value and Tax Risk Sixth-Order Fitted Polynomial 
 
Figure 1 is the graphical representation of the estimated coefficients of model (10) and including TAXRISK 
squared and TAXRISK to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth powers. 
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